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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECTS OF DIRECT ACTION STATUTES
Introduction
At common law, an injured party was usually unable to recover
under the tortfeasor's insurance policy because of strict concepts of
privity of contract' and clever policy wording on the part of the in-
surance company.2 Consequently many judgments proved worthless,
since the defendant was often judgment proof and the plaintiff had
no right of action against the insurance company. In recent years,
largely due to the advent of the automobile, liability insurance has
come to be looked upon as a contract entered into primarily for the
benefit of the public rather than the insured. 3 Accordingly, statutes
have been enacted giving the injured party a right of action against
the tortfeasor's insurance company if the judgment against the tort-
feasor remains unsatisfied. New York 4 and a majority of other jur-
isdictions have adopted this type of remedial legislation.5 However,
some states have made a more radical departure from the common
law. Rhode Island has enacted a statute permitting a direct action
against the insurer if the insured cannot be served within the juris-
diction. 6 Wisconsin's direct action statute, limited to automobile lia-
bility policies, permits joinder of the insurance company in an action
brought against the insured.7 Louisiana amended its statute in 1930
1 See, e.g., Ford v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 80 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. S.C.
1948).
2 If the policy insured the wrongdoer against liability, a debtor-creditor
relationship arose between the insurer and the insured when a judgment was
rendered against the insured. The injured party could then reach the insurance
by garnishment proceedings against the insurer. See, e.g., Anoka Lumber Co.
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 63 Minn. 286, 65 N.W. 353 (1895); Hoven v. Em-
ployers' Liability Assur. Corp., 93 Wis. 201, 67 N.W. 46 (1896). However,
where the policy was one of indemnity, no indebtedness arose on the part of
the insurer until the outstanding judgment was paid by the insured. If the
insured was insolvent, so that the judgment could not be satisfied, the insurance
company was under no obligation to either the insured or the injured party.
See, e.g., Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 145 Fed. 881 (3d Cir. 1906). Conse-
quently, insurance companies issued indemnity rather than liability policies.
3 See Leigh, Direct Actions Against Liability Inmurers, [1949] Ixs. L.J.
633.
, N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(b). This section provides that no policy shall be
issued or delivered within the state unless it contains a provision that the in-
solvency or bankruptcy of the insured shall not release the insurance company,
and that an action may be maintained against the insurer if the judgment against
the insured remains unsatisfied for thirty days. The constitutionality of this
statute was upheld in Merchants Mut. Automobile Liability Ins. Co. v. Smart,
267 U.S. 126 (1925).
5 See Leigh, supra note 3, at 637.
6 R.I. GEN. LAws c. 155, § 1 (1938).
WIS. STAT. §§ 85.93, 260.11 (1953).
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to give the injured party an option to bring a direct action against
the insurer or against the insurer and insured jointly.8
Conflict of Laws and Constitutional Considerations
Direct action statutes, as would be expected, have raised many
problems, both in the field of conflict of laws and in the area of con-
stitutional law. In transitory causes of action, the general conflict
rule is that matters of "substance" are governed by the law of the
place where the contract was made and matters of "procedure" are
governed by the law of the forum. 9 Conflict problems arise, however,
when the jurisdiction in which suit is brought permits a direct action
against the insurer, whereas the insurance policy contains a "no
action" clause,' 0 valid in the state where the contract was made, pro-
hibiting such direct actions. Rhode Island overcame these conflict
difficulties, to a large extent, by holding its direct action statute to be
substantive and hence restricted in its application to policies entered
into within the state." Similarly, Wisconsin has refused to permit
direct actions when the policy contains a "no action" clause which
would be valid in the state where the contract of insurance was en-
tered into. 2
The law in Louisiana, on the other hand, has been largely un-
certain. Although the courts have sometimes held the statute to be
substantive,' 3 in conflict situations the statute has generally been held
to be procedural, and hence applicable to all liability insurance con-
tracts, including those entered into outside of Louisiana.' 4 The stat-
ute was revised in 1948, however, and the courts interpreted the
revision as limiting the right of direct action to policies issued within
the state.'5 Apparently, such was not the legislative intent, for the
8 See Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, [1949] Ixs. L.J. 411, 413.
9 See GOODRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (3d ed. 1949) ; see, e.g., Anderson
v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d 836 (1946);
Coderre v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 48 R.I. 152, 136 At. 305 (1927).
10 The typical "no action" clause provides that no action shall lie against
the insurance company until the insured has sustained a loss through payment
of a judgment. See Michel v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 82 F.2d 583, 587(5th Cir. 1936). See note 2 supra.
"1 See Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 48 R.I. 433, 138 Atl. 186 (1927);
Coderre v. Travelers' Ins. Co., supra note 9.
12 See Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950) ; Byerly
v. Thorpe, 221 Wis. 28, 265 N.W. 76 (1936).
"1 See, e.g., West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 217 La. 189, 46 So.2d 122, 123(1950); see Fisher v. Home Indemnity Co., 198 F.2d 218, 220-221 (5th Cir.
1952).
14 See Rogers v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 142 (W.D.
La. 1945); Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So.2d
875 (1946) ; Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1936).
Is See Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co., 89 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. La.
1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1951).
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statute was amended shortly thereafter to expressly provide that the
right of direct action shall exist with respect to injuries incurred
within Louisiana, irrespective of where the policy was written or de-
livered and regardless of provisions in the policy prohibiting such
direct action. 16  At the same time, a statute was enacted requiring
that insurance companies consent to direct suit before obtaining a
certificate to do business in Louisiana.17
Both statutes were immediately subjected to attack on constitu-
tional grounds, but were upheld by the Louisiana courts.18 However,
conflicting decisions as to their constitutionality were rendered when
direct action suits were brought in Louisiana federal courts. Under-
lying this division of authority was a basic difference of opinion as
to the requirements of due process. In the cases in which the direct
action statute was held unconstitutional, 19 the courts adopted the
stricter interpretation of due process advanced by the Supreme Court
in a series of cases beginning with Allgeyer v. Louisiara.2° Under
this view, a state may not constitutionally give extraterritorial effect
to its laws by enlarging or abridging the obligations of a contract
validly entered into in another state.2 ' In the decisions upholding
the validity of the direct action statute,22 the courts adhered to the
broader "governmental interest" theory of due process as found in
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n.23  Under this
theory, a statute enacted by a state in the exercise of its police power
is not necessarily void if it affects contracts made in other states. If
the subject matter was within the reasonable scope of regulation, the
end legitimate, and means appropriate, the statute would be upheld
as a proper exercise of the state's police power.24  This disagreement
as to what constitutes due process also led the courts to opposite con-
clusions on the constitutionality of the statute which conditioned the
insurer's right to do business within the state on consent to direct
16 LA. REV. STAT. tit. 22, §655 (Supp. 1952).
17Id. § 983(E).
I See, e.g., McDowell v. National Surety Corp., 68 So.2d 189 (La. App.
1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 995 (1954) ; Churchman v. Ingram, 56 So.2d
297 (La. App. 1951).
19 See, e.g., Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Eunice Rice Milling Co.,
198 F2d 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 876 (1952); Fisher v. Home
Indemnity Co., 198 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1952); Bayard v. Traders & General
Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951).
20 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
21 See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143 (1934) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922) ; New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914).
22 See, e.g., Lewis v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465
(W.D. La. 1952) ; Buxton v. Midwestern Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. La.
1952); Bouis v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 91 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. La.
1950).
23 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
24 See Griffin v. MeCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S.
53 (1940).
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actions. One line of decisions 25 held that such a condition violated
due process, in that it deprived the insurance company of a valuable
property right, i.e., the "no action" clause, and hence fell within the
category of "unconstitutional conditions." 26 The other held that due
process was not violated since the condition was a reasonable one in
view of Louisiana's vital interest in the subject matter.17 With the
law in this highly unsatisfactory state, there was an obvious need for
judicial clarification. This need was met by two recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court.
The Watson and Elbert Cases
The case of Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp.28
concerned a direct action brought by a Louisiana resident against a
manufacturer's liability insurer for injuries sustained through use of
the insured's product. The insurance contract had been negotiated
and issued in Massachusetts. The policy contained a "no action"
clause, which was valid in Massachusetts, prohibiting any action
against the insurer until final determination of the liability of the
insured. The defendant insurer, however, had consented to direct
actions in order to obtain a certificate to do business in Louisiana.
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the direct action
statute and the provision requiring consent as a condition of doing
business. The Court sustained both statutes through a liberal ap-
plication of the "governmental interest" theory of due process. Stress-
ing the fact that "[p] ersons injured or killed in Louisiana are most
likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have
to care for them," " the Court concluded that Louisiana had sufficient
interest in the subject matter to warrant the enactment of the statutes
in question. A similar line of reasoning was employed to answer the
defendant's contention that the Full Faith and Credit clause required
the application of the contract law of Massachusetts. The Court held
that other states were not compelled by the Constitution to automati-
cally subordinate their laws to the law of the state where the contract
was made. The Court weighed the interests of both states in the
contract and found that the interest of Louisiana in protecting persons
injured within her borders "plainly" outweighed whatever interest
25 See, e.g., Mayo v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 106 F.
Supp. 579 (W.D. La. 1952); Bish v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 102
F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1952), aff'd mer., 202 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1953).
26 1 . . [A] condition attached by a state to a privilege is unconstitutional
if it requires the relinquishment of a constitutional right." Hale, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoL. L. Rav. 321 (1935).
27 See, e.g., Lewis v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465
(W.D. La. 1952); Buxton v. Midwestern Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. La.
1952).
28 75 Sup. Ct. 166 (1954).29Id. at 170.
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Massachusetts might have.30  Finally, the Court held that since the
direct action statute was constitutional and could be applied with or
without the insurance company's consent, the law compelling insur-
ance companies doing business within the state to consent to such
actions was likewise constitutional.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, although concurring in the result, would
have rested the decision solely upon the power of a state to admit a
foreign corporation subject to all reasonable conditions, including
consent to direct actions. However, he seriously questioned the power
of Louisiana, in the absence of such consent, to alter the obligations
of the Massachusetts contract. In his view, the recent decisions of
the Supreme Court had not made inroads on the principle laid down
in the Hartford Indemnity Co. case 31 that a state may not ". . . enlarge
the obligations of the parties [to a contract made in another state]
to accord with every local statutory policy solely upon the ground that
one of the parties is its own citizen." 32 Moreover, he pointed out
that Massachusetts had substantial interest in the enforcement of the
"no action" clause,33 since the financial well-being of insurance com-
panies operating in Massachusetts is of considerable importance to
the citizens of that state.
A companion case, Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert,34
concerned a direct action arising out of an automobile accident which
occurred in Louisiana. The plaintiff brought an action in a federal
district court against the tortfeasor's insurer, an Illinois corporation,
on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The defendant challenged the
existence of diversity jurisdiction, alleging that the real controversy
was between the injured party and the tortfeasor, both of whom were
Louisiana citizens. The defendant also contended that the tortfeasor
3o The Court dismissed as being "wholly void of merit" the contention that
the statutes violated the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution. The
Court found that the statute fell with equal force on all insurance companies,
both foreign and domestic. However, the real hardship of the direct action,
i.e., the jury factor, falls solely upon the foreign insurance company. This fact
was pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in the
Elbert case where he recognized that ". . . by the fortuitous circumstance that
this Louisiana litigant could sue directly an out-of-state insurance company,
she can avoid her amenability to Louisiana law. In concrete terms, she can
cash in on the law governing jury trials in the federal courts, with its restric-
tive appellate review of jury verdicts, and escape the rooted jurisprudence of
Louisiana law in reviewing jury verdicts." Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co.
v. Elbert, 75 Sup. Ct. 151, 157 (1954). See note 36 infra.
31 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S.
143 (1934).
32 Id. at 149.
33 For a discussion of the harsh effects which result from rendering the "no
action" clause inoperative, see Bish v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 102
F. Supp. 343, 347-349 (W.D. La. 1952), aff'd nen., 202 F.2d 954 (5th Cir.
1953) ; Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co., 89 F. Supp. 736, 740 (E.D.
La. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1951).
3475 Sup. Ct. 151 (1954).
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was an indispensable party and that failure to join the tortfeasor de-
prived the court of jurisdiction. Both arguments were rejected, how-
ever, and a unanimous Court held that the insurer was the real party
in interest, since the direct action statute created a separate and dis-
tinct cause of action which the injured party could pursue in lieu of
his action against the tortfeasor.3 5 The Court reasoned that the
bringing of a direct action against the insurer was apparently an
abandonment of the cause of action against the tortfeasor, and hence
a complete disposition of the entire controversy could be made in the
action against the insurer, without joining the tortfeasor. Conse-
quently, direct actions could be brought in federal courts if diversity
of citizenship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant insurer,
even though the plaintiff and the tortfeasor were citizens of the same
state.
The Aftermath of the Watson and Elbert Cases
Although both of these decisions will serve to clarify much of
the confusion that has surrounded the application of direct action
statutes, many new problems are presented. Now that the Louisiana
direct action statute has been upheld, a question immediately arises
as to what extent the states are bound to recognize, in actions brought
in their courts, another jurisdiction's direct action statute. The an-
swer to this question is important for two reasons. First, it is well
known that plaintiffs, in personal injury actions, are inclined to seek
out a favorable forum. This tendency is even more marked in
Louisiana where appellate review of jury verdicts in civil cases ex-
tends to both matters of law and fact.36 The limited review of jury
verdicts and the higher recoveries had in other jurisdictions might
cause direct action suits to be brought outside of Louisiana. More-
over, the bringing of such foreign suits is greatly facilitated by the
fact that the insurance company is usually incorporated or doing busi-
ness in several states. Secondly, the mere mention of a tortfeasor's
insurance is considered so prejudicial as to be reversible error in all
but four states.3 7
35 However, there is some question as to whether the Louisiana statute
creates supplementary remedies rather than a right to elect between the two
remedies. See Lafield v. United States Casualty Co., 114 F. Supp. 688 (W.D.
La. 1953); see Elbert v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 108 F. Supp. 157,
162-163 (W.D. La. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 201 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1953),
aff'd, 75 Sup. Ct. 151 (1954).
3 LA. Cozsr. Art. VII, § 29. See Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (U.S.
1830) (illustrates the difference between the standard of review in Louisiana
courts and the limited review had in federal courts). The wide scope of review
permitted in Louisiana has kept personal injury recoveries within reasonable
limits. See, e.g., Scarborough v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 11 So.2d
52 (La. App. 1942).37See Elbert v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co., 202 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.
1953) (dissenting opinion), aff'd, 75 Sup. Ct. 151 (1954).
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In the past, the courts in other jurisdictions found little difficulty
in disposing of direct action suits. Since the direct action statute was
held to be procedural by the courts of Louisiana, some states disre-
garded it and applied their own procedure.3 8  Further, a Michigan
court held that such actions were barred because of policy considera-
tions prohibiting the disclosure of insurance, and in view of the fact
that the local statute required an outstanding judgment against the
insured before an action could be brought against the insurance com-
pany.3 9 It is to be noted, however, that this case was decided prior
to the Elbert and Watson cases. Now that the Supreme Court has
recognized that the interest of Louisiana in protecting accident victims
is sufficient to authorize the enactment of a direct action statute, other
states' public policy may not be strong enough to prevent the bringing
of direct actions in their courts. In Hughes v. Fetter,40 the Supreme
Court held that the fact that Wisconsin permitted a wrongful death
action for deaths caused within the state was sufficient to show that
Wisconsin had no strong public policy against wrongful death actions
in general. Consequently, the Wisconsin policy against entertaining
suits brought under the wrongful death acts of other states was not
strong enough to override the requirements of the Full Faith and
Credit clause. Many states prohibit the disclosure of insurance and
yet have statutes which permit direct actions against the liability in-
surers of public carriers 41 and certain sureties. 42 Thus if the strict
test found in the Hughes case were applied, the public policy of these
states might be held insufficient to warrant a denial of a forum to
plaintiffs in direct action suits. Moreover, the Supreme Court in the
Elbert case apparently adopted the view that the direct action statute
was substantive, citing two Louisiana cases.43  If in the future Louis-
iana holds its statute to be substantive, the states accepting Louisiana's
interpretation could no longer disregard the statute on the ground
that it was purely procedural.
38 See, e.g., Wells v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir.
1942) ; McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939) ;
cf. Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W. 2d
836 (1946).
39 See Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d
547 (1946). But cf. Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So.
316 (1938), overruled on other grounds, McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
supra note 38.
40341 U.S. 609 (1951).
41 E.g., GA. CoDa ANN. tit. 68, § 68-612 (Supp. 1951); IOwA CODE ANN.
c. 325, § 325.26 (Supp. 1954).42 E.g., S.C. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 10-702 (1952). "When an indemnity bond
or insurance is required by law . . .against personal injury founded upon tort
the principal and his surety ...may be joined in the same action and their
liability shall be joint and concurrent."
43 See Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 75 Sup. Ct. 151, 154 (1954).
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Shortly after the Watson and Elbert decisions, an opportunity
to pass upon this problem was presented in Collins v. American Auto-
mobile Ins. Co.,4 4 decided by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. The Collins case involved
a direct action brought on a policy issued and delivered in Louisiana
where the accident took place. The plaintiff was a resident of Virginia
and the tortfeasor a resident of Louisiana. The defendant insurer
moved to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff, however, claimed to
be in the federal court as a matter of right. The court held that
neither the Elbert case nor the diversity 4 5 or venue 46 provisions of
the Judicial Code affected the court's power to transfer the case to a
federal court in Louisiana 47 or to dismiss it in the exercise of its
discretionary power under the doctrine of forum non conVeniens.48
The court took notice of the fact that the suit was brought in a juris-
diction which regards the mention of a tortfeasor's insurance as a suf-
ficient ground for a mistrial, and that the sole reason for bringing
suit here was "to obtain the benefit of the reputed largesse of New
York City juries." The suit was dismissed, however, on the ground
of forum non conveniens,49 thus avoiding the question of whether the
statute was substantive or procedural, as well as the problem of weigh-
ing the public policy of New York against that of Louisiana. Conse-
quently, resolution of the conflict between local public policy and the
requirement that the direct action statute be given full faith and
credit must await further litigation.
Conclusion
Although Louisiana may be justified in enacting a direct action
statute, other states are equally justified in refusing to permit direct
actions to be brought in their courts. In Louisiana, recoveries are
kept within reasonable limits, at least in the state courts, since there
is appellate review of jury verdicts both as to the law and the facts.
-4 Civil No. 93-340, S.D. N.Y., Feb. 3, 1955.
4528 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1952).
46 Id. § 1391(c).
7 Id. § 1404(a). "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought"
48 For diversity purposes, a federal court adjudicating a state-created right
is, in effect, only another court of the state in which it sits. See Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). Consequently a suit will be dis-
missed if it would have been dismissed in the state courts. See Munch v.
United Air Lines Inc., 184 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1950); Trust Co. of Chicago v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 183 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1950).
49 The court relied on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The
Gilbert case involved a tort action arising in another state between a nonresident
plaintiff and a foreign corporation.
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Where appellate review is limited, however, strong public policy dic-
tates that the presence of insurance should not be disclosed since
* . juries are much more apt to return a verdict for the injured
party, and for a larger amount, if they know that the loss is to ulti-
mately fall on an insurance company." 50
5 0 Kuntz v. Spence, 67 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. App. Conm'n 1934). "Once
this information [the presence of insurance] has reached the jury . . . the
juror no longer pictures before him the individual defendant but rather the
financially responsible insurance company. All the forces which work against
the large corporation defendant again come into play with the added factor that
the insurance company has been paid for its coverage and, as the juror sees it,
must necessarily have contemplated the payment of unfavorable verdicts against
its assureds." Baer, The Relative Roles of Legal Rides and Non-Legal Factors
in Accident Litigation, 31 N.C. L. REv. 46, 55 (1952).
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